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INTRODUCTION
The Internet is based on a layered, end-to-end model that
allows people at each level of the network to innovate free of any
central control. By placing intelligence at the edges rather than
control in the middle of the network, the Internet has created a
platform for innovation.
—Vinton Cerf1
Over the past five years, social networking sites such as
Facebook,2 Google,3 and Twitter4 have changed the way people
use the Internet and interact with each other. These websites serve
as a platform for people to connect with other users of the site and
share information, pictures, and, increasingly, their real-time
location. The explosive growth of sites such as Facebook and
MySpace has spawned a second generation of social networks.
Second generation social networks push the privacy envelope even
further than initial experiments in information sharing by
encouraging users to share a catalogue of their possessions, address
books, and real-time purchases. Correspondingly, the everincreasing amount of personal information divulged via these sites
has had, and will continue to have, dramatic implications for the
social networking sites, their users, and the law. Federal courts,
1

Letter from Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google,
Inc., to Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, and Hon.
John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 8,
2005), available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/11/vint-cerf-speaks-out-on-netneutrality.html.
2
Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
3
Google, http://www.google.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
4
Twitter, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
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Congress, and the industry itself will be making difficult and
complicated decisions in the near term about how to protect users
of social networking sites from the misuse of information that they
have provided on a social network. Several recent controversies
over a social network’s use of personal information have the
potential of spurring Congress to enact comprehensive privacy law
reform, limiting the amount and use of information available to
social networks.5
For decades, artists, politicians, and ordinary people alike have
fretted over the United States government wiretapping their phones
and tracking their movements by satellite and other “creepy”
mechanisms of government surveillance.6 Indeed, in George
Orwell’s classic, 1984, government surveillance was central to
creating the terrifying persona of Big Brother.7 The recent
revelation by author Matthew M. Aid that the National Security
Agency (“NSA”) is constructing a storage site to catalog quotidian
email conversations between American citizens only serves to
substantiate those anxieties.8 Even in the private sector, these
5

See discussion infra Part I.A.4.
See, e.g., Jeremy Redmon, Cameras May Police City Streets, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Oct. 26, 2009, at A1 (“‘It’s kind of creepy,’ said Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of
the Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center. ‘Mass surveillance is
essentially directed toward everyone, so it doesn’t matter if you are someone planning a
crime or if you are a resident or tourist or someone who is walking into an office building
to go to work. Everyone gets swept into these big databases.’”).
7
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Thomas Pynchon ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1949).
8
See MATTHEW M. AID, THE SECRET SENTRY: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 286–309 (2009); see also James Bamford, Who’s in Big
Brother’s Database?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/23231 (describing the construction of a NSA facility that is designed to hold at
least “a septillion pages of text”).
On a remote edge of Utah’s dry and arid high desert, where
temperatures often zoom past 100 degrees, hard-hatted construction
workers with top-secret clearances are preparing to build what may
become America’s equivalent of Jorge Luis Borges’s “Library of
Babel,” . . . .
. . . It’s being built by the ultra-secret National Security Agency—
which is primarily responsible for “signals intelligence,” the
collection and analysis of various forms of communication—to house
trillions of phone calls, e-mail messages, and data trails: Web
searches, parking receipts, bookstore visits, and other digital “pocket
litter.”
Bamford, supra.
6
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concerns have long been a focal point of anxiety in futuristic
interpretations of our society. In Minority Report, for example, the
character played by Tom Cruise receives advertisements projected
onto his eyes based on where he is at the moment.9 The eerie
music and dark, ominous atmosphere suggest that if society ever
reaches that point, doom is surely just around the corner.
Recent developments in location-based social networking
applications10 bring the American populace far closer to locationspecific advertising than ever before and are forcing Americans,
courts, and Congress to reimagine and redefine privacy rights and
expectations. With applications like Loopt,11 Foursquare,12 and
any of the thousands of applications available on the iPhone, the
Internet community is ironically creating, using, and exploring the
very surveillance and lack of privacy that the general population
feared for so long. The potential for aggregating personally
identifiable information (“PII”) across a dizzying array of start-up
social networks has the potential of completely erasing the idea of
privacy and anonymity on the Internet. Second generation start-up
social networks allow users to share a pattern of their locations
with their “friends”13 (Foursquare), a virtual catalogue of their
possessions via YingYang.com,14 and their real-time credit card
purchases (Blippy).15 As users of second generation social
networking allow their “friends” to track their movements on a
continual basis, and allow them access to increasing amounts of
personal information, it will become increasingly important for the
9

MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 2002).
Location-based social networking refers to applications, websites, and online
networks that use global positioning system (“GPS”) technology to pinpoint the real-time
location of the user and allow other users access to that information. GPS uses satellites
and a hand-held device carried by the user to track the location of the user and then
broadcast that location on the Internet. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 13.
11
About Loopt, http://www.loopt.com/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
12
Foursquare, http://www.foursquare.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
13
Id. A “friend” on Facebook or YingYang is a connection requested by one user and
confirmed by another user, which allows both parties access to certain information each
user has provided to the site. Usually, the “friending” process substantiates an existing
real world connection, but not always. See, e.g., William Lozito, Facebook Linguistics:
Changing the Definition of Friend/Unfriend, NAME WIRE, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://www.namedevelopment.com/blog/archives/2009/01/facebook_lingui.html.
14
YingYang, http://www.yingyang.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
15
Blippy, http://www.blippy.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
10
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sites themselves to actively and cooperatively ensure the protection
of their users’ privacy.
We are at the dawning of a new age in terms of privacy, and
the rapidly changing landscape of privacy rights and expectations
will force hard decisions to be made regarding what aspects of a
person’s identity should be protected as private information as
users of social networks willingly divulge more and more personal
information.
As social networks expand and share their
application programming interfaces (“APIs”), information posted
and shared by users will be updated across platforms. Likewise,
when information is shared across and between social networks,
the enforceability and predictability of which privacy policy
governs that sharing of that information becomes complicated.
This Note seeks to make sense of U.S. privacy law as it relates to
social networking. With more and more social networks making
use of location-based technology, and an increasing amount of
information existing online about social networking users, the
issues raised in this Note and how courts, legislatures, and the
Internet community resolve them will undoubtedly shape the future
of technology, communication, and Internet commerce.
Recent scholarship on legal issues relating to privacy policies
and the enforceability of terms of use agreements has been written
from the perspective of consumers,16 alternatively warning users of
“contracting away control over personal information,”17 accusing
social networks of “industrial-scale identity theft”18 and seeking
16

See, e.g., Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive
Personal Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001) (arguing that the sale and commercial use of users’
information is a violation of individual privacy rights); Edward J. Janger, Muddy
Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1801, 1878 (2003) (advocating greater consumer privacy rights through
the gathering of personal information by Internet companies during bankruptcy
proceedings); Andrew Hotaling, Comment, Protecting Personally Identifiable
Information on the Internet: Notice and Consent in the Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 529, 531 (2008) (arguing that consumers are “[i]nadequately
protected against private actors by state and federal statutes”).
17
See generally Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away
Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587 (2007).
18
Rohit Khare, Privacy Theater: Why Social Networks Only Pretend to Protect You,
TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/27/privacy-theater.
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legal avenues, as strained as they may be, of holding websites
liable for using personal information.19 This Note takes an
alternative perspective by advocating an approach that focuses on
increased industry self-regulation, recognizing that overprotection
of consumer privacy has the potential to stifle entrepreneurship and
cripple Internet-based commerce and innovation. Despite concerns
over users not reading or understanding the terms of use
agreements that govern the use of personal information on a social
network, a more flexible, reactive, and fluid approach to privacy20
offers the benefit of being able to adapt to the incredibly rapid pace
of change in privacy expectations due to the growth and use of
social networks.21 This approach does not suggest that social
networks abdicate responsibility for their users’ privacy. Rather, it
encourages the social networking industry, which includes
businesses as small as YingYang and those as dominant as Google,
to take several steps to affirmatively protect their users’ privacy
and create an environment where users can feel comfortable
sharing information. As comprehensive legislative overhauls of
privacy law wind their way through the legislative process, this
Note urges Congress to be aware of both the tradition of Internet
self-regulation and the benefits of a laissez-faire approach to
privacy before taking irreversibly misguided action.22

19
Yasamine Hashemi, Note, Facebook’s Privacy Policy and Its Third Party
Partnerships: Lucrativity and Liability, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 140, 150–56 (2009)
(exploring “whether Facebook’s privacy policy could be used to bring a cause of action”
and describing three potential claims users might pursue against Facebook).
20
See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last
visited Feb. 18, 2010).
21
Facebook, for example, as of this writing, is less than six years old and yet has over
350 million users. Facebook Factsheet, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?
statistics (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
22
See, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009).
Senator Leahy introduced the PDSA with the following goals:

Increase criminal penalties for identity theft involving electronic
personal data and make it a crime to intentionally or willfully
conceal a security breach involving personal data;

Give individuals access to, and the opportunity to correct, any
personal information held by commercial data brokers;

Require entities that maintain personal data to establish internal
policies that protect the personal data of Americans;
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Part I of this Note examines the existing laws and
jurisprudence on privacy, terms of use agreements, and issues
surrounding user-generated content. While courts, legislatures,
and academics have put forth many potential resolutions to the
privacy issues discussed in this piece, this Note will examine three:
a common law approach, a comprehensive statutory approach, and
a free-market approach. Part II of this Note analyzes two
approaches to modifying privacy law and terms of use agreement
law to respond to recent issues that have arisen as a result of
location-based social networking applications and sites. One
approach is the common law modification approach, whereby
courts take it upon themselves to reshape terms of use agreements
when the plaintiff alleges an infringement of privacy. The second
approach is a legislative one, advocated and adopted by
international communities and a number of legal academics, which
would comprehensively overhaul privacy law in the United States.
Part III offers an alternative approach to both of the approaches
discussed in Part II; while recognizing a limited role for Congress,
this approach relies on the free market and cooperative action by
social networks to remedy and prevent breaches of privacy and use
of personal information. Relying on recent events in the social
networking industry and recognizing the complexity that APIs
contribute to the enforceability of terms of use agreements, the
approach offered by this Note encourages Congress to codify and
courts to apply strict notice requirements to terms of use
agreements. At the same time, this Note argues against legislative
interference with social networks, which would be a radical
reversal for United States privacy policy. As this Note will argue,
the free market and industry self-regulation offer the most


Require entities that maintain personal data to give notice to
individuals and law enforcement when they experience a breach
involving sensitive personal data; and

Require the government to establish rules protecting privacy and
security when it uses information from commercial data brokers,
to conduct audits of government contracts with data brokers and
impose penalties on government contractors that fail to meet
data privacy and security requirements.
Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Judiciary Committee Advances Leahy’s
Cybersecurity Bill (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_
releases/release/?id=bf6687fb-676b-4444-91bb-c66afec6cb9a.
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practical, effective, and predictable approach for both consumers
and companies in a rapidly changing landscape of privacy
expectations in the social networking space.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TERMS OF USE AGREEMENTS LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
Part I.A of this Note examines the history of privacy law in the
United States. Recognizing the complexities of privacy law as a
discrete sector of U.S. law, this Note focuses with particular
emphasis on information privacy law. Legal protection for basic
information privacy has deep roots in American and English
jurisprudence, yet does not resemble the comprehensive and
thoroughness of other legal systems. Part I.B analyzes the
intersection of basic contract principles in terms of use agreements.
Terms of use agreements, which are primarily a common law
creation, fit untidily within traditional notions of contract law,
thereby perpetuating an uneasy tension as courts seek to interpret
their creation and content in the Internet age.
A. Privacy Law
Privacy law, as a discrete sector of American law, is a rather
fragmented and incomplete body of law.23 This Note looks
specifically at information privacy law, which is distinguished
from sexual privacy law or family planning privacy law.24
Information privacy law derives from three primary sources: (1)
the Constitution, (2) legislation, and, to a lesser extent, (3)
Part I.A.1–3 of this Note will examine the
academia.25
development of information privacy law in chronological order.
Accordingly, Part I.A of this Note will begin by looking at the
23

See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, ‘La Difference’ Is Stark in EU, U.S. Privacy Laws, MSNBC,
Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15221111/ns/technology_and_scienceprivacy_lost.
24
See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002)
[hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy] (identifying six classifications of privacy
rights, one being “control over personal information”).
25
See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 541 (explaining the sources of information privacy
law); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
855–56 (3d ed. 2006).
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colonial era, followed by the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth century, when privacy law became institutionalized.
Finally, Part I.A.4 will look at twenty-first century developments
in information privacy law. By exploring the roots of information
privacy law, this subsection will seek to provide a working
definition of information privacy rights and explore the
complexities posed by social networking sites to those rights.
1. Colonial Era Foundations of Information Privacy Law
This section of this Note will examine the roots of information
privacy law.
Although understandings, definitions, and
implications of information privacy law have morphed
considerably since the eighteen and nineteenth century, shaping the
future of information privacy law requires an understanding of its
roots.26 Despite the low population density of America at its
founding, early American laws demonstrate that privacy was not
taken for granted.27 The relatively few number of people in these
early settlements meant, “everybody knew each other’s
business.”28 Accordingly, laws existed to protect personal privacy.
Professor Solove identifies laws against eavesdropping29 and
against being a “common scold,” which applied only to women as
early examples of privacy focused laws.30 Importantly, both of
these examples of colonial privacy protection law assume a lack of
consent by the invadee. In other words, presumably, should those
who are speaking grant permission to the “eavesdropper” to “listen
under walls or windows,” the action would no longer be a crime,

26

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND
TECHNOLOGY 2 (2d ed. 2009) (“Information privacy law is an interrelated web of tort
law, federal and state constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary
privileges, property law, contract law, and criminal law. Information privacy law is
relatively new, although its roots reach far back.”).
27
DAVID FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 133 (1972).
28
Daniel J. Solove, The Origins and Growth of Information Privacy Law, 828 PLI/Pat
23, 27 (2005) [hereinafter Solove, Origins].
29
Id. at 27 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
168 (1769)) (defining eavesdropping as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves
of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and
mischievous tales”).
30
See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1978).
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even if the eavesdropper heard more than the invadee originally
intended.
Nonetheless, early American privacy laws focus primarily on
intrusions of the government on privacy.31 Of particular concern
to prominent early Americans was the government’s use of general
warrants and writs of assistance.32 Noted as “the worst instrument
of arbitrary power . . . that ever was found in the English law
book,”33 writs of assistance allowed officials to enter a house and
conduct “sweeping searches and seizures without any evidentiary
basis.”34 General warrants authorized similarly intrusive searches
and seizures, often resulting in the ransacking and arbitrary seizure
of the papers and writings of political dissenters.35 Again, it is
important to note that the Framers were principally concerned with
the one-sided, powerful central government conducting
unauthorized searches of the house.
The Framers formalized their concerns with privacy in the Bill
of Rights, with privacy being a central component of the Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The Third Amendment protects
the privacy of the home by barring the government from requiring
the quartering of soldiers in a private home, “without the consent
of the Owner.”36 The Fourth Amendment “provides broad
limitations on the government’s power to search and seize”37 and
31

See Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 28 (“At the time of the Revolutionary War,
the central privacy issue was freedom from government intrusion.”).
32
See id. (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999);
Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994)).
33
James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, Boston, Mass. (Feb. 1761) (transcript
available at The National Humanities Institute).
34
Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1998).
35
See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); see also
William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
405–07 (1995).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. III. For a more fulsome analysis of laws protecting the privacy
of one’s home, see Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 27–28 (citing Semayne’s Case,
(1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 168; Note, The Right to
Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894 (1981)). Professor
Solove identifies protection of one’s home as fundamental to the idea of privacy law in
America. See id.
37
Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 28.
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prevents the practice of general warrants or overly broad searches
conducted by the government.38 Finally, the Fifth Amendment
gives individuals the right not to be compelled to testify against
themselves.39 The government cannot compel an individual to
speak against his own interests during a criminal proceeding.40 A
detailed examination of these amendments is beyond the scope of
this Note, however, it is nonetheless important for courts,
legislatures and start-up companies alike to recognize that
America’s earliest attempts to protect its citizens from privacy
intrusions focused on arbitrary searches in which one party did not
give consent to the other party for such an intrusion.
2. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century in Information
Privacy Law
During the nineteenth century, American law began to mature
as more discrete privacy concerns began to arise. The practice of
collecting information for the census became controversial when
the number of personal questions asked by the federal government
boomed from four for the first census in 1790 to 142 in 1860.41 A
public outcry erupted in 1890 when the census asked about family
diseases and finances, leading to legislation in the early twentieth
century limiting the scope of information included in and produced
by the census.42 Additionally, the security and confidentiality of
the mail system were major issues during the nineteenth century.43
38

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”).
39
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
40
Id.
41
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 46 (1995).
42
Id. at 47.
43
Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 30.
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Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,
Alexander Hamilton, and even Ralph Waldo Emerson expressed
concerns over their ability to transmit correspondence safely and
privately.44 Concerns with the security of the mail system led
Congress to pass several laws criminalizing the unauthorized
opening of mail.45 The Supreme Court provided constitutional
protection to privacy of correspondence when it held, in Ex parte
Jackson,46 that the Fourth Amendment required government
officials to obtain a permit before opening letters.47
Mirroring the privacy concerns that have arisen as a result of
the expansion of the Internet, the development of a new
technology, telegraphs, raised red flags over privacy of
correspondence and control of personal information.48 During the
Civil War, the Union and Confederate armies tapped each other’s
telegraph lines and rival news organizations attempted to “scoop”
each other by intercepting telegrams.49 The New York Times called
the practice “an outrage upon the liberties of the citizen.”50 While
a bill introduced in Congress to protect telegraphs ultimately
failed, several courts secured the privacy of telegraphs by
analogizing them to letters and more than half of the states enacted

44

Id.; see also ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 49–50 (2000) (explaining that
Benjamin Franklin required his employees to swear not to open his mail and describing
Emerson’s frustrations with the mail system).
45
SMITH, supra note 44, at 50–52. A statute passed in 1825 provided:
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post
office or any unauthorized depository for mail matter, or from any
letter or mail carrier, . . . before it has been delivered to the person to
whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or
to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes,
embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned.
Id. at 52.
46
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
47
Id. at 733.
48
See Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 31–32.
49
Id. at 31; see also REGAN, supra note 41, at 111.
50
SEIPP, supra note 30, at 31.

C08_TERENZI_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FRIENDING PRIVACY

5/19/2010 12:46 PM

1061

laws prohibiting the disclosure of telegraph messages by company
employees.51
Commentators also point to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Boyd v. United States52 as an important development in
information privacy law.53 In Boyd, the government sought to
compel a merchant to produce personal and business documents in
a civil forfeiture proceeding.54 The Court relied on both the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments in striking down the government’s
request.55 In its most articulate definition of privacy to that point,
the Court stated that allowing such a request would be an “invasion
of [the merchant’s] indefeasible right to personal security, personal
liberty and private property.”56 Accordingly, Boyd and its progeny
established a powerful legal recognition of personal privacy.57
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The
Right to Privacy,58 an article that would define and shape close to a
century of privacy law.59 Warren and Brandeis argued that
common law could and should develop greater protections for
privacy rights.60 Warren and Brandeis’s article is particularly
51

See, e.g., Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (Mo. 1880) (holding that a subpoena for
telegrams must fail because “such an inquisition . . . would destroy the usefulness” of
telegrams); see also SEIPP, supra note 30, at 65.
52
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
53
See, e.g., SEIPP, supra note 30, at 70; Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 32; William
J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016,
1054–55 (1995).
54
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619.
55
See id. at 634–38.
56
Id. at 630.
57
Stuntz, supra note 53, at 1050.
58
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
59
See, e.g., ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946) (noting that
the article “add[ed] a chapter to our law”); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966) (calling the
Warren and Brandeis article the “most influential law review article of all”); Solove,
Origins, supra note 28, at 34 (describing the publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article
as “the most profound development in privacy law”).
60
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 58, at 198 (“The common law secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments,
and emotions shall be communicated to others.”); see also Solove, Origins, supra note
28, at 35 (“Warren and Brandeis argued that the common law could readily develop a
remedy for protecting privacy.”).
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relevant to this Note because it argued that the development of
technology, most notably “instantaneous photography,”61 and an
increase in the availability and prevalence of newspapers would
lead to widespread privacy abuses.62 Warren and Brandeis argued
that these threats required a remedy and recognized that existing
tort law, such as defamation and libel, protected against the spread
of false information but not true private information.63 They
acknowledged however, that traditional common law concepts
such as contract and property were not adequate for the mode of
protection they envisioned and, instead, urged courts to develop a
discrete common law action and remedy for protecting privacy
based on a more general right of “the individual to be let alone.”64
Arguably, privacy rights and protections reached an apex towards
the end of the nineteenth century.65 Congress and courts retreated
significantly from such an inclusive definition of privacy as the
twentieth century progressed and the government’s need for
personal information increased with the rise of the powerful
“fourth branch,” administrative agencies.66
Warren and Brandeis’s article had tremendous influence over
courts and legislatures in the beginning of the twentieth century.67
In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals, New York state’s
highest court, heard the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.68 The court held that the plaintiff, who sued because an
advertisement used a picture of her without her consent, failed to
61

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 58, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”).
62
Id. at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”).
63
See id. at 214–18.
64
Id. at 205, 214–18.
65
See Stuntz, supra note 53, at 1052 (“As it happened, the cases did not continue along
Boyd’s path. Beginning in the first decade of this [twentieth] century, Boyd was
effectively cabined . . . .”).
66
See Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1819
(1996).
67
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (1960) (recording
over 300 privacy cases spawned by the Warren and Brandeis article).
68
64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
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state a cause of action because “no precedent for such an action
[can] be found in the decisions of this court.”69 A significant
debate ensued from the court’s decision, as New York Times
editorials and law review articles extolled the need to create a tort
for breaches of privacy.70 In 1903, New York did indeed enact
such a statute.71 In the years following the Roberson decision,
state courts and legislatures continued to develop privacy law and
expand the remedies available to plaintiffs who suffered invasions
of that right.72 By 1960, the Restatement of Torts enshrined much
of what Warren and Brandeis had argued for in their landmark
article.73 The Restatement included four privacy torts: (1)
Intrusion Upon Seclusion, (2) Public Disclosure of Private Facts,
(3) False Light, and (4) Appropriation.74
Wiretapping and the power of the federal government to
conduct surveillance on American citizens became the central front
of the battle for increased privacy rights in the middle of the
twentieth century. First, in 1928, the Supreme Court held in
Olmstead v. United States75 that the Fourth Amendment did not
require the government to obtain a search warrant before
wiretapping a telephone.76 Congress subsequently enacted section
605 of the Federal Communications Act, which prohibited the

69

Id. at 443.
Denis O’Brien, The Right to Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 437 (1902) (providing
examples of New York Times editorials).
71
For a current version of this law, see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2009).
72
See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905) (holding
that the “right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law”).
73
The Restatement of Torts is a non-binding but persuasive and ostensibly objective
attempt by a committee of experienced practitioners and legal academics to articulate a
consensus on the current state of tort law.
74
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2). A detailed discussion of the case law
that led to each of these torts is beyond the scope of this Note; see Solove, Origins, supra
note 28, at 37–40, for more discussion and history.
75
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
76
Id. at 464 (“There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
houses of offices of the defendants.”). But see id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet.”).
70
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interception and disclosure of intercepted communications by
federal, but not state, officials.77 In subsequent Supreme Court
decisions,78 the court limited the reach of § 605, holding that the
law restricted officials “only from disclosing intercepted
communications in court proceedings,” not from wiretapping in the
first place.79 Throughout the twentieth century, wiretapping
became widespread and increased exponentially as a result of these
rulings.80
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court substantially
developed privacy law in a series of decisions.81 Ultimately, the
Court recognized a “zone of privacy” as a constitutional right
insulated from interference by federal and state actors, but stopped
short of recognizing such a right as enforceable against private
actors.82 In Griswold v. Connecticut,83 the Court held that the right
to privacy against state and federal actors is a “penumbra” of rights
“created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees” found
in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.84 In United States v.
Miller,85 on the other hand, the Court held that personal financial
records in possession of third parties are not within the “zone of
privacy” recognized in Griswold.86 Congress acted quickly to
provide the protection to privacy that the Court refused to
recognize in Miller.87
77

Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat.
1064, 1103–04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006)).
78
See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (finding evidence
obtained as the fruit of illegal wiretapping could not be used in court); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (excluding evidence directly obtained by wiretapping).
79
Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 43; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H.
ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 260 (3d ed. 2000).
80
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1128–33 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers].
81
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
82
See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 542–43.
83
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84
Id. at 485.
85
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
86
Id. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”).
87
See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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While Congress enacted a number of privacy laws in the
1970s,88 the focus of this Note is on the expectation of privacy and
privacy rights between private parties. Congress’s first attempt to
regulate such commercial behavior came in 1978 with the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”).89 In a nod to Justice Brennan’s
dissent in Miller,90 the RFPA prohibited banks and other financial
institutions from disclosing personal financial information about
their customers without a subpoena or search warrant.91 The
statute is limited in scope, providing evidence of Congress’s
hesitation to interfere with the market.
The blossoming of federal legislation protecting privacy in the
1970s would continue in the 1980s with several new statutes, the
most significant of which was the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (“ECPA”).92 Title I, the Wiretap Act,93 and Title II,
the Stored Communications Act,94 of the ECPA dramatically
strengthened both the civil and criminal penalties private actors
faced for violations of privacy and unauthorized disclosure of
88
See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C (2006)); Privacy Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a));
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Foreign Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No.
89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1002).
89
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
90
See Miller, 425 U.S. at 447–54 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Hotaling, supra
note 16, at 543 (“[T]he reasoning behind [Justice Brennan’s] dissenting opinion became
highly influential in Congress’s efforts to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy in various forms of personally identifiable information.”).
91
12 U.S.C. § 3407.
92
18 U.S.C. § 2510; see also Katherine A. Oyama, E-Mail Privacy After United States
v. Councilman: Legislative Options for Amending ECPA, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 499,
503 (2006) (explaining that the ECPA provides constitutional protection due to the
unclear gap in the Fourth Amendment’s application to cyberspace); Paul Taylor, The
Scope of Government Access to Copies of Electronic Communications Stored with
Internet Service Providers: A Review of Legal Standards, 6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 109, 117
(2001) (noting the enactment of the ECPA as Congress’s response to the emergence of
electronic communication and the digital era).
93
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
94
Id. §§ 2701–11.
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personal information. Reflecting a consistent congressional desire
to avoid overly burdening market transactions, the ECPA
exempted intentional interceptions of communications if one party
to the transaction consented.95
Further, the Stored
Communications Act allows for a defense based on consent.96 The
extent to which a clicked-through terms of agreement amounts to
consent for the purposes of avoiding liability under the ECPA and
other federal privacy laws is the subject of much debate and,
partially, the focus of this Note.97 Nonetheless, it is clear that
Congress intended to allow private parties a means of contracting
around the restrictions embodied in the ECPA.98
3. Recent Developments in the Law of Information Privacy
The computer came into the public consciousness during the
1960s and sparked an immediate concern with privacy disclosures
made through the computer.99 The interests and concerns first
expressed at the dawn of the computer age have become more
acute as personal computing has grown and the data collected by
Internet-based companies has become more comprehensive.
Congress has reacted by passing a number of privacy protection
statutes.100 The most important mechanism in enforcing privacy
protection has been the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”)
efforts to make companies accountable when they violate their
own privacy policies.

95

Id. § 2511(2)(d).
Id. § 2702(b)(3).
97
See discussion infra Part II.
98
See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 545.
99
See Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 48 & n.162 (citing MYRON BRENTON, THE
PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); ARTHUR MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); NOMOS
XII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971); VANCE PACKARD, THE
NAKED SOCIETY (1964); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); ALAN WESTIN &
MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND
PRIVACY (1972); Clark C. Havighurst, Foreword: Symposium, Privacy, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (1966); Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls over the
Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342
(1966); Symposium, Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV.
211 (1968)).
100
See Acts cited supra note 88.
96
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One statute that merits consideration is the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (“GLBA”) of 1999.101 The law allowed financial
institutions with different branches to share “nonpublic personal
information” between affiliates.102 The law included a requirement
for affiliates to notify customers that their information would be
shared, but it did not allow consumers to stop the sharing.103 The
law is important because it demonstrates Congress’s lack of
consistency on the issue of privacy, as this law lacks even the
consent requirement most other laws contained. Most financial
institutions did include an opt-out provision, but few customers
opted-out, complaining that the privacy policies were confusing or
misleading.104 The arguments against the opt-out provisions
financial institutions used to comply with the GLBA are similar to
those being advanced presently by courts, legislators, and
consumer advocates against the click-through terms of use used by
most websites today—they complain that the agreements are
vague, cumbersome, and difficult to understand.105
Over the past ten years, the FTC has been responsible for the
largest amount of work with respect to protecting personal
information on the Internet.106 The FTC can bring enforcement
actions against companies who fail to abide by their own privacy
policies.107 Enforcement actions for violations of privacy policies
are generally resolved between the company and the FTC in a
settlement, resulting in a dearth of case-law on the subject.108
However, it seems clear that as long as the company abides by its

101

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09).
102
15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)–(b).
103
Id.
104
Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230–31 (2002).
105
See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 552.
106
See Haynes, supra note 17, at 603, 613–14; Hashemi, supra note 19, at 155.
107
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2).
108
Hashemi, supra note 19, at 155–56; cf. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1208, 1208 (2004) (highlighting that only a few cases explain how the Stored
Communications Act works).
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own privacy policy, regardless of how broad it may be, the
company will likely not be subject to FTC enforcement.109
While the events of September 11, 2001, certainly reshaped
privacy as a body of law, most of those shifts have occurred within
the government-citizen relationship. The focus of this Note
concerns privacy law between private parties in the commercial
context, and accordingly, this Note will not focus on the USA
PATRIOT Act110 or related wiretapping issues raised in the wake
of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. More important to this discussion is
the extent to which terms of use agreements and contracts validly
transfer rights of control over personal information freely given by
users to companies on the Internet.
4. Recent Controversies
Lately, there has been increasing attention paid to the
information that users of social networking sites disseminate on the
Internet and to the control social networking sites exercise over
that information.111 Of particular concern is the extent to which
social networking websites should be allowed to sell, distribute, or
otherwise transmit information to third party application
developers.112 Once a user submits information about his or her
birthday for example, the social network can then give that

109
See Hashemi, supra note 19, at 156; cf. Haynes, supra note 17, at 588 (“[I]f the
website complies with its own promises, there is little else to prevent the site from doing
with the information whatever it wants—sharing, selling or otherwise making use of the
information—besides the website company’s own interest in attracting and maintaining
customers.”).
110
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
111
See Jason Kincaid, Massive Facebook and MySpace Flash Vulnerability Exposes
User Data, TECHCRUNCH, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/11/05/massive
-facebook-and-myspace-flash-vulnerability-exposes-user-data; see also Jason Kincaid,
Facebook Rewrites Privacy Policy, Foreshadows Location Services, TECHCRUNCH, Oct.
29, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/10/29/facebook-rewrites-privacy-policyforeshadows-location-based-services; Posting of Alistair Croll to GigaOm, Big Internet Is
Web 2.0’s OS—So Who Owns the Apps?, http://gigaom.com (Oct. 18, 2007, 21:00 EST).
112
See ANDREW BESMER ET AL., SOCIAL APPLICATION: EXPLORING A MORE SECURE
FRAMEWORK 1 (2009), available at http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/proceedings/a2besmer.pdf.
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information to an external developer.113 The external developer
can then plug that information into an algorithm, which then
becomes permanently part of the third party’s program or
application.114 Even if the user abandons the social network, the
user’s information is not only no longer within the user’s control,
it is also no longer within the social network’s control.115 This
situation raises significant issues about privacy as the relationship,
as is, creates a nearly irrevocable level of access to the user’s
information once the user agrees to the terms of use agreement.
In November of 2007, Facebook launched its now infamous
Beacon program with forty-four partner websites.116 Beacon
essentially tracked a Facebook user’s movements around the
Internet and broadcast certain activities on the user’s wall as part
of his or her news feed.117 Even if a Facebook user was not signed
into Facebook at the time, information between Facebook and the
partner site was exchanged and then disseminated via Facebook.118
Lacking an obvious opt-out mechanism and instituted
automatically, Beacon soon became a focal point of user ire,
prompting a string of critical blog posts on technology blogs and a
number of Facebook user groups devoted to its termination.119
Sure enough, in early 2009, Facebook abandoned the program and
apologized to its users for abusing their trust and personal

113

Id.
Id.
115
See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 20.
116
Press Release, Facebook, Leading Websites Offer Facebook Beacon for Social
Distribution (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=9166
(“Additional websites and companies participating in Beacon at launch include
AllPosters.com, Blockbuster, Bluefly.com, CBS Interactive (CBSSports.com &
Dotspotter), ExpoTV, Gamefly, Hotwire, Joost, Kiva, Kongregate, LiveJournal, Live
Nation, Mercantila, National Basketball Association, NYTimes.com, Overstock.com,
(RED), Redlight, SeamlessWeb, Sony Online Entertainment LLC, Sony Pictures, STA
Travel, The Knot, TripAdvisor, Travel Ticker, TypePad, viagogo, Vox, Yelp,
WeddingChannel.com and Zappos.com.”).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See, e.g., The Idea Shower, Block Facebook Beacon, http://www.ideashower.com/
blog/block-facebook-beacon (Nov. 7, 2007).
114
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information.120 During the Beacon program, Facebook faced the
defection of thousands of users.121
Facebook caused another controversy with its changes in terms
of use and privacy policy in December 2009. On December 5,
2009, Facebook alerted all of its members when they signed on to
the site that their privacy settings had been changed and were now
set for automatic indexing on public search engines. Previously,
the information on Facebook was not accessible via a standard
search engine. The “blogosphere” erupted in outrage over
Facebook’s change in policy.122 As of the writing of this article,
Facebook has not responded to the controversy. Facebook’s two
privacy controversies attract attention to a difficult and
complicated issue, thereby strengthening calls for Congress to pass
laws making Facebook’s abuse of privacy illegal.
Second generation social networks have contributed to recent
worries regarding privacy as well. RockYou, a social networking
site, had accumulated 32,603,388 users and their personal
identification since its launch in 2006.123 On December 14, 2009,
the company came under a firestorm of criticism when Imperva, a
security firm, discovered that RockYou stored the passwords of all
of its users in an easily accessible, plaintext format online.124 By
storing the websites in such an obvious manner and by not
protecting the information from discovery, RockYou demonstrated
120
Facebook to Terminate the Beacon Program, FINANCIAL, Aug. 12, 2009,
http://www.finchannel.com/Main_News/Tech/53576_Facebook_to_terminate_the_Beaco
n_program.
121
On December 3, 2009, Facebook settled a set of claims concerning its Beacon
program and notified users of the settlement. See Posting of Nick O’Neil to All
Facebook, Facebook Users Receive Notice of Pending Class Action Settlement,
http://www.allfacebook.com/2009/12/facebook-users-receive-notice-of-pendingfacebook-settlement/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=
Feed%3A+allfacebook+%28Facebook+Blog%29 (Dec. 3, 2009, 18:45 EST).
122
See, e.g., Jason Kincaid, The Facebook Privacy Fiasco Begins, TECHCRUNCH, Dec.
9, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/09/facebook-privacy/?utm_source=feed
burner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+%28TechCrunch&
29; Brennon Slattery, Why Privacy Concerns Are Ruining Facebook, PCWORLD, Dec. 2,
2009,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/183530/why_privacy_concerns_are_ruining_
facebook.html.
123
See Khare, supra note 18.
124
Serious SQL Flaw Could Have Compromised Millions of Rockyou.com Users,
TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=8612.
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the vulnerabilities of an industry that lacks statutory protection.
RockYou violated its own terms of use agreement by not
protecting the information and passwords of its users, yet lawsuits
brought in reaction to the security breach are unlikely to yield
favorable results.125
Despite the existence of privacy laws in Colonial America, in
recent decades, information privacy law in the U.S. has been
constructed on an ad hoc basis, resulting in a set of rights that
depend on private enforcement instead of enforcement through the
courts.126 While courts have certainly been instrumental in
initiating and recognizing a set of information privacy rights, most
of those rights have been either protected against government
intrusion or left to the market to protect in the private sector.127
Importantly, despite various attempts by Congress to define and
protect privacy rights,128 the rapidly changing landscape of
technology and social networks have left current protections and
laws in place out of date and ineffective. Social networking sites
are effectively being called to ensure online privacy protection by
Congress’s repeated failures to do so lest users abandon this
otherwise beneficial commercial activity.
B. Terms of Use and Basic Contract Principles
Courts have struggled recently to determine the extent to which
traditional contract principles apply to terms of use agreements in
the electronic commerce context.129 The resolution of this turmoil
will have dramatic consequences for Internet companies, especially
125
See Khare, supra note 18; see also Nik Cubrilovic, RockYou Hack: From Bad to
Worse, TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyouhack-security-myspace-facebook-passwords/.
126
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Enforcing Privacy Rights: Agency Enforcement and Private
Rights of Action, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 877 (2003).
127
See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2002) (indicating that
plaintiff asserted privacy rights for stored electronic communications).
128
See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006)); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
129
See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (using
ordinary contract principles, a shrinkwrap license is a valid and enforceable contract);
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding
software license agreements are binding contractual agreements).
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social networking websites. In order to understand the trouble
courts and legislators have with applying traditional contract
concepts to click-through terms of use agreements, it is necessary
to define different forms of terms of use agreements and how
contract law has been applied to them over the past twenty years.
The first section of this Part will briefly examine basic contract law
and principles. Contract law is, for the most part, a creation of
common law, meaning that the rules regulating the construction,
interpretation, and enforcement of contracts have been crafted by
court decisions on the topic and modified by legislation. Next, this
section looks at different forms of terms of use agreements and
how the form of a terms of use agreement affects its enforceability
in court.
1. Basic Contract Law
A contract is a legally enforceable promise or set of
promises.130 While on its face, this definition seems simple
enough, in fact, whether a contract exists at all is often a
painstaking and fact-intensive inquiry.131 Contracts require an
agreement; that is, there must be an offer and an acceptance of the
terms of a contract in order to create a legally enforceable duty
between the two parties to a contract.132 Additionally, contracts
must contain consideration, which is “something (such as an act, a
forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a
promisor from a promisee.”133 Again, as used in everyday
language, these requirements seem plain and straightforward
enough, but decades of case law and competing interpretations

130

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981); 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
1:1 (4th ed. 1990); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 1 (5th ed.
2003).
131
PERILLO, supra note 130, at 1 (“No entirely satisfactory definition of the term
‘contract’ has ever been devised.”).
132
Id. at 2 (“‘[A]greement’ is at the core of the law of contracts . . . .”).
133
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining consideration as an essential
element to a contract “necessary for an agreement to be enforceable” (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1979))); see also THOMAS E. HOLLAND,
THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 286 (13th ed. 1924) (“‘[C]onsideration’ has been
explained to be ‘any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant, or a stranger, derives a
benefit or advantage . . . .’”).
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demonstrate that finding and defining a contract is an endeavor
riddled with complications.134
A legally enforceable contract requires the assent of the parties
it binds.135 Typically, establishing an agreement requires the
process of offer and acceptance.136 As contract law has developed,
there has been disagreement over what standard to use in
determining the existence of assent, objective or subjective.137
Advocates of a subjective approach to determining the existence
and meaning of contracts argue that a “meeting of the minds” is
required to substantiate the agreement between the parties.138 The
subjective approach to contracts gives respect to party autonomy
by recognizing the parties’ intentions primarily, instead of the
literal meaning of the words in the contract.139 Strict subjective
approaches to contract law would look “solely to the intention of
the party” who created the contract or to whom the contract was
directed.140 This approach is impractical because it would
essentially allow any party the opportunity to escape its obligations
to a contract by pleading that it intended something different than
what is written.141 A more palatable subjective standard “would
134

See PERILLO, supra note 130, at 1–3.
Id. at 26 (“Usually an essential prerequisite to the formation of a contract is an
agreement: a mutual manifestation of assent to the same terms.” (citing Russell v. Union
Oil, 86 Cal. Rptr. 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Quality Sheet Metal v. Woods, 627 P.2d
1128 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v. Considine, 310 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981); Christenson v. Billings Livestock Comm’n, 653 P.2d 492 (Mont. 1982))).
136
See id. at 26 (citing Dura-Wood Treating v. Century Forest Indus., 675 F.2d 745 (5th
Cir. 1982); Hahnemann Med. Coll. & Hosp. v. Hubbard, 406 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979); Eisenberg v. Cont’l Cas., 180 N.W.2d 726 (Wis. 1970)).
137
See PERILLO, supra note 130, at 26–28. Compare Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent
in the Formation of Contracts, in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 119,
126 (1931) (advocating a subjective standard for determining the existence of assent),
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1980) (requiring objective
manifestation of agreement).
138
Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 429 (2000).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Cf. id. at 429 (“It is improbable that any economically developed society would fully
adopt either of these vantage points. One party’s intentions would be subordinated to the
idiosyncratic meanings of the other. More importantly, if the legal system permits parties
to testify as to their understandings or intentions, perjury as to their subjective states of
mind would be extremely difficult to detect.”).
135
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allow only such meanings as conform to an intention common to
both or all the parties, and would attach this meaning although it
violates the usage of all other persons.”142 The subjective
approach is popular today in France, though in America, the
objective approach holds sway.143
The objective approach to contract law has dominated the
common law of contracts in America for at least the past
century.144
Like subjective approaches, there is no single
“objective approach.”145 One objective approach to contract law is
the “general usage” test, which dictates that the terms of the
contract are enforceable as written, even if it is clear from other
evidence that they are not the terms that either party intended.146
This approach exhibits less respect for party autonomy than the
subjective approach by subordinating the parties’ intent to the need
for regular application of language; however, it does allow the
courts interpreting contracts more ability to maintain consistency
and predictability.147
More moderately, the objective test
emphasizes the perspective of “the reasonable person in the
position of the addressee” of the terms.148 This approach allows
some room for differing understandings of language in the
contract.

142

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 227(3) (1932). The first Restatement stated this as a
possible standard, but did not adopt it, and instead favored an objective standard.
143
See, e.g., 2 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL
SYSTEMS 1316–19 (R. Schlesinger ed., 1968); BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF
CONTRACT 35, 47–49 (2d ed. 1992); cf. Perillo, supra note 138, at 430 (“Although some
observers indicate that in practice there is little difference in result in the application of
the French subjective approach and the common law’s objective approach, the difference
in theory explains, among other things, why in France there is no definitive rule on
whether an acceptance is effective on dispatch or on receipt.”).
144
Perillo, supra note 138, at 431–32 (“Consequently, contract law, when viewed
together with the law of evidence, was a mixture of subjective and objective elements
with the objective elements dominating the decisions of almost all concrete cases.”).
145
See id. at 431 (“Objective tests also vary.”).
146
See, e.g., Nicholson Air Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 706 A.2d 124, 132
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (“When the language of the contract is clear, the court will
presume that the parties intended what they expressed, even if the expression differs from
the parties’ intentions at the time they created the contract.”); see also Perillo, supra note
138, at 431.
147
See Perillo, supra note 138, at 431.
148
Id.
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Courts generally interpret contracts in modern America using
the objective standard.149 Accordingly, an offer and acceptance by
at least two parties creates a set of legally enforceable duties
between the parties as specified by the terms of the contract.
However, terms of use agreements have recently become
problematic for courts. Due to the standardized form of terms of
use agreements and the one-sided nature of the offer and
acceptance process, courts have begun to look at the terms of use
agreements offered by Internet companies as potentially outside
the ambit of traditional contract interpretation. Some courts have
gone so far as to void terms of use agreements even though those
agreements objectively meet the requirements for a valid contract.
2. Terms of Use Agreements
This section seeks to provide a working definition of different
terms of use agreements and then discusses which contract
doctrines and principles are most directly implicated by the
proliferation of terms of use agreements. This Note examines
terms of use agreements because they typically govern both the
privacy policy and control over the information provided by the
user to the Internet company.150 This is particularly important in
the context of social networking websites because users provide
vast amounts of data about themselves to these websites.151 The
extent of control that users retain over that information and the
right to sell, use, and transmit that personal information is typically
addressed in the terms to which users agree before accessing the
website and handing over their information to the social
network.152

149

2 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 6 (1st ed. 1855) (“Therefore,
modern courts interpret contracts according to an ‘objective’ theory by first looking to the
explicit words the parties used, and then by ‘giv[ing] to the contract the construction
which will bring it as near to the actual meaning of the parties as the words they saw fit to
employ . . . will permit.’”).
150
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006)
[hereinafter Lemley, Terms of Use].
151
See, e.g., Facebook, supra note 2.
152
See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 20.
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a) What is a Terms of Use Agreement?
For the purposes of this Note, a terms of use agreement is a set
of promises proposed by a website and agreed to by the user of the
website. For example, YingYang.com is a social networking
website that bases its concept of “friends” on users who have
similar interests in material possessions, such as watch collections,
sneakers, and more.153 When a user visits YingYang.com, he or
she is required to accept YingYang, Inc.’s terms of use in order to
become a user (i.e., get a handle, create a profile, post and tag
pictures, etc.) on YingYang.com.154 The terms of use agreement
henceforth governs the legal duties and liabilities between
YingYang, Inc. and the users of YingYang.com. Accordingly, the
terms of use agreement delineates the legal responsibilities of both
parties and what each party is allowed to do with the information
of the other party. Crafting a comprehensive terms of use
agreement, therefore, is a crucial aspect of beginning a social
networking website as courts will refer to the terms of use
agreement to determine any claims that may arise between the two
parties.
Terms of use agreements come in three principal forms:
shrinkwrap agreements, browsewrap agreements, and clickwrap
agreements.155 Shrinkwrap agreements are licenses included with
physical copies of software, purchased by a consumer.156 The
contract theory behind these licenses is that “by breaking the
shrinkwrap or running the program” the user consents to the terms
of agreement; the user thereby creates a mutually binding contract
based on his or her acceptance of the offer of terms of use by the
producer of the software.157 A one-sided bargain offer such as this
shrinkwrap agreement is a unilateral contract, and though
examples of such contracts are rather scarce in non-electronic
scenarios, they do exist.158
153

About YingYang, http://www.yingyang.com/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
YingYang Terms of Use, http://www.yingyang.com/terms (last visited Feb. 18,
2010).
155
See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459–60.
156
Id. at 467.
157
Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property].
158
See Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 551 (1983).
154
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Until 1996, every court confronted by shrinkwrap licenses held
them unenforceable.159 Among other reasons, courts noted the
lack of an opportunity for the consumer to review the terms before
being bound by them,160 the lack of options for a user if he did not
assent to the terms,161 and the lack of clear evidence of consent on
the user’s part162 as reasons to hold shrinkwrap licenses
unenforceable. In 1996, Judge Easterbrook wrote an influential
opinion upholding the terms of a shrinkwrap terms of use in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.163 Judge Easterbrook relied on the
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-204, which states that a
contract may be formed in any manner to which the parties
agree.164 Accordingly, Judge Easterbrook held that by installing
the software, the user consented to the terms of use agreement
included in the packaging.165 While not universally followed,166
federal courts have, more often than not, held shrinkwrap
agreements enforceable since 1996.167
159

Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459 (citing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v.
Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102–03 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 268–70 (5th Cir. 1988); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831
F. Supp. 759, 763–66 (D. Ariz. 1993); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp.
1006, 1009–10 (D. Kan. 1989)).
160
See, e.g., Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 104.
161
See, e.g., Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 270.
162
See, e.g., Ariz. Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 766.
163
86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
164
U.C.C. § 2-204 (2004) (“Formation in General. (1) A contract for sale of goods may
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including . . . conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of a contract. . . . (2) An agreement sufficient to
constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is
undetermined. (3) Even if one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (“A
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”).
165
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452–53.
166
See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 469 (citing Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000); Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys.,
Inc., No. C96-3998TEH, 1997 WL 258886, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1997); Novell v.
Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (D. Utah 1997), vacated in part, 187
F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 127 P.3d 560, 562 (Okla.
2005), republished in 138 P.3d 826, 827 (Okla. 2005)).
167
Id. (citing Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 2005); Bowers
v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop
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Browsewrap agreements are terms of use agreements the user
may not read at all; the user, however, consents to the terms of use
by using the website.168 Browsewrap agreements are typically
included on a website and accessed by clicking a link which often
appears on the bottom of the page.169 Even in the context of
electronic contracting, there is a “dearth of settled law” regarding
browsewrap agreements.170 Underlying the dispute over the
enforceability of browsewrap agreements and their validity as
contracts is the lack of notice given to users of the actual terms
contained within the agreements.171 The hyperlink at the bottom of
a webpage directing users to the terms of use is often insufficient
to give the consumers actual notice of the terms of use they are
accepting through use of the webpage.172 Because of the weakness
of notice in browsewrap agreements, courts have devised means of
protecting consumers but are generally unwilling to extend the
same protection to businesses that repeatedly access a website.173
Courts generally find that browsewrap agreements are
unenforceable when a consumer sues a website to avoid liability
under the terms of the browsewrap agreement.174 However, most
often, browsewrap litigation surrounds a company’s misuse of a
competitor’s website,175 and in these cases, courts will generally

Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v.
LRP Publ’ns, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-1859, 2000 WL 1468535, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20,
2000); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519
(W.D. Pa. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 307
(Wash. 2000)).
168
Ian A. Rambarran, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up to Be?
2–3 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1885, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1885.
169
Id. at 5.
170
Id. at 3 (citing Christina Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied
Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 289 (2003)).
171
See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
172
Rambarran, supra note 168, at 5 (noting that “browse agreements do not have the
same notice guarantees” as other forms of electronic contracting because the terms of the
agreement are “incorporated by reference”).
173
See, e.g., Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459, 472–73.
174
Id. at 462 (citing Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 556–
57 (1st Cir. 2005); Waters v. Earthlink, Inc., 91 F. App’x 697, 698 (1st Cir. 2003);
Specht, 306 F.3d at 35–38).
175
Id. at 472–73.
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enforce a browsewrap agreement against the defendant
company.176 This tends to happen when a company exploits
another company’s user’s information for its benefit, either to
collect contact information for potential customers or to directly
contact users, in violation of the terms of use agreement. The
federal courts likely treat these agreements with greater deference
to the agreement itself because of an underlying presumption that
businesses are more sophisticated parties than the average
consumers, and if they are seeking to profit from a given website,
they should be aware of the terms of engaging the website.
Clickwrap agreements are the most widely used type of
electronic terms of use agreements and the most consistently
upheld as enforceable by courts.177 Clickwrap agreements are
terms of use agreements that require the user to click a link that
says “I Agree” or otherwise give affirmative consent to the terms
of use before accessing the website’s content.178 By forcing the
user to scroll through the agreement, or at least presenting him or
her with the agreement and requiring action on his or her part, the
clickwrap agreements avoid the notice issues present with the
browsewrap agreements.179
In 2007, the American Bar Association promulgated a series of
recommendations to avoid legal issues with electronic contracting.
Its “legal best practices for electronic contracting” identified four
“bottom line” steps for forming legally binding online contracts:180
1. The user must have adequate notice that the
proposed terms exist;

176

Id. at 460 (citing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428–30 (2d Cir.
2004); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No.
CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Pollstar v.
Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000)).
177
See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459.
178
Id.; see also Rambarran, supra note 168, at 7 (“Click-through agreements require
users to assent affirmatively to terms before downloading or using a service or product.”).
179
See Rambarran, supra note 168, at 7–8.
180
ThinkingOpen, How Do I Build an Enforceable Online Agreement?—Not (Always)
the Way SalesForce.com or Google Would, http://thinkingopen.wordpress.com/2008/03/
08/how-do-i-build-an-enforceable-online-contract-not-always-what-salesforcecom-or-go
ogle-would-do (Mar. 8, 2008).
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2. The user must have a meaningful opportunity to
review the terms;
3. The user must have adequate notice that taking a
specified, optional action manifests assent to the
terms; and
4. The user must, in fact, take that action.181
Clickwrap agreements generally satisfy these requirements by
presenting the user with the terms of use before allowing him or
her to access content on or interact with the website. Indeed, until
recently, nearly every time a court faced a clickwrap agreement, it
found it enforceable and binding upon the parties.182 However,
recently there has been tension and disagreement between federal
courts and circuits on the issue of enforceability.
b) Contract Doctrines Implicated by Online Contracting
There are several important doctrines of contract law that are
implicated by the use of online contracting. First, the doctrine of
third party beneficiary is particularly important with regards to
social networking websites and user-generated content. Second, a
contract voidable for unconscionable terms is also pertinent to this
discussion. Finally, contracts voidable for unfair bargaining power
are also at issue in this discussion.
The third party beneficiary doctrine is a contract doctrine that
allows third parties to a contract to sue and enforce promises or
duties intended to protect them even though they are not a party to
181

Id.
See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459 (“Every court to consider the
issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses, in which an online user clicks ‘I agree’ to standard
form terms, enforceable.” (citing Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638–39 (8th
Cir. 2005); Salco Distribs., L.L.C. v. iCode, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-642-T-27TGW, 2006 WL
449156, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive
Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 781–83 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Mortgage Plus, Inc. v.
DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2592, 2004 WL 2331918, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2004); iSys., Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1951(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 742082, at *6 (D.
Minn. Mar. 29, 2004); Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451–52
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328,
330–31 (D. Mass. 2002); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98-20064JW,
1998 WL 388389, at *3–9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction
assuming such an agreement was enforceable without reviewing the merits); Caspi v.
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999))).
182
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the contract.183 One requirement is that the contract must have
been made for their benefit, thereby largely limiting the doctrine’s
availability to third parties.184 Despite several attempts by
litigants, the third party beneficiary doctrine has yet to succeed in
court to enforce rights based on a terms of use agreement.185
Some courts have found certain clauses of the terms of use
agreements unenforceable because they were unconscionable or
ambiguous. Courts will occasionally invoke “unconscionability”
as a reason to “refuse to enforce oppressive bargains on grounds of
substantive unconscionability.”186 Ambiguous terms are terms that
lack a sufficiently clear definition or context within the contract to
be enforceable by courts.187 As will be discussed later, courts
struggle to apply traditional contract principles to electronic
contracts as the contemporary form of contract and methods of
assent used by the parties clash sharply with older notions of
contract law.188
Social networking websites exist in a strange tension with their
users.
Networks like Facebook.com, Loopt.com, and
YingYang.com require users to contribute to their websites in
order to be a “value added” service. The term “value added”
means that as more users contribute to the site with pictures,
information, and applications used exclusively by the site and its
users, the site becomes more valuable, and, in turn, more used,
visited, and profitable. The concept is referred to as “sticky”
content because content generated by social networking users that
is exclusive to that site sticks to the site and is what draws more

183

See generally PERILLO, supra note 130, at 663–67.
Id.
185
See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Kremen v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Am. Plaza Corp., No.
08 Civ. 8980(PKC), 2009 WL 1158829 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009); Dluhos v. Strasberg,
No. Civ.A. 00-3163(JCL), 2005 WL 1683696 (D.N.J. June 24, 2005); Morrison v. Am.
Online, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930 (N.D. Ind. 2001); see also Posting of Thomas O’Toole
to E-Commerce and Tech Law Blog, Online, Third-Party Beneficiary Claims Are Likely
Losers, http://pblog.bna.com/techlaw/2009/05/online-thirdparty-beneficiary-claims-arelikely-losers.html (May 1, 2009).
186
PERILLO, supra note 130, at 382.
187
See id. at 382–87.
188
See discussion infra Part II.A.
184
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users to use the site.189 Social networking websites challenge
traditional notions of ownership and consumer-owner
relationships.190
The United States legal system has had a long tradition of
defining property and ownership based on the efficient allocation
of resources. The Lockean Proviso is a famous edict by one of the
seventeenth century’s greatest political philosophers, John Locke,
and is a fairly traditional view on what creates ownership.191 The
Lockean Proviso argues that the fruits of one’s labor are one’s own
possession.192 In other words, a person who works on something
can claim at least partial ownership of it.
Social networks challenge this understanding of ownership
because users are constantly creating, adding to, and producing
content on social networking websites, yet they do not own the
material or a portion of the site. Rather, the site, by the terms of
agreement, co-opts the information and declares ownership of it.
Accordingly, users add value to the website; indeed, usergenerated content on sites such as Facebook is what makes the site
attractive for other users and yet, users never own anything they
add to the site.193
Ultimately, understanding privacy rights and a social
networking site’s freedom to use personal information posted or
shared by users requires an understanding of both the history of
United States privacy law and contract law.194 Congress has in
only rare instances enacted laws codifying privacy rights and only
189

NetLingo, Sticky Content, http://www.netlingo.com/word/sticky-content.php (last
visited Feb. 18, 2010) (defining “sticky content” as “[i]nformation or features on a Web
site that gives users a compelling reason to revisit it frequently”).
190
See Croll, supra note 111.
191
See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952).
192
Id. at ch. 5 § 27.
193
In fact, in a recent case, Finkel v. Facebook, No. 102578/09, 2009 WL 3240365
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2009), it appears the plaintiffs alleged for the first time anywhere
that immunity should not attach when the social networking defendant (in this case,
Facebook) actually gains from value-added of user contributions. Id. While the case was
dismissed, id., this line of reasoning could have important consequences for the future of
immunity litigation under 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006), which generally gives immunity to
social networking sites.
194
See discussion supra Part I.
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on very specific issues, such as the ECPA. Yet, courts continue to
reinterpret privacy rights, beginning with Griswold and continuing
through today. Courts have been attempting to use traditional
common law principles to provide greater protection for privacy
than legislatively afforded. The use of personal information by
social networks gives rise to a host of new privacy considerations.
The next Part of this Note will examine two proposals to address
the host of issues raised by social networks and location-based
technology.
II. THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY APPROACHES
Concerns for the privacy of users of social networking sites
have led both courts and legislatures to begin to adopt and apply a
set of ad hoc rules to provide greater protection for users. There
are two principal ways that courts and commentators have
approached the issue of increasing privacy protections for social
networking site users. First, courts have begun using a common
law approach to strike down terms of use agreements as
unenforceable when the site has not demonstrated sufficient notice
procedures or when the terms of use agreement has been drafted
too broadly.195 Alternatively, commentators have taken cues from
Canada and the European Union to suggest adopting a legislative
approach to enhancing privacy controls in cyberspace.196
Advocates of a legislative overhaul tend to suggest amending the
ECPA as a legal mechanism to provide consumers with greater
protection and control over the content they post on social
networking sites.197
This Part first looks at several recent court cases that have
struck down terms of use agreements as unenforceable. Parsing
these decisions is crucial for social networking websites in order to
understand what is acceptable in drafting terms of use agreements.

195
See discussion infra Part II.A (describing recent federal courts’ holdings that relied
on common law doctrines to strike down terms of use agreements as unenforceable and
void).
196
See infra notes 292–306 and accompanying text (explaining recent international
edicts on privacy and arguments for amending the ECPA).
197
See infra notes 266–79 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, this Part looks at arguments by commentators
pushing for a myriad of common law solutions to privacy
concerns. Next, this Part collects various academic articles and
privacy directives issued by other countries and attempts to distill
the essence of what is being proposed as potential changes to the
privacy law landscape regarding terms of use agreements.
A. The Common Law Approach to Increasing Online Privacy
Protection
Courts have taken the issue of terms of use agreements as they
relate to privacy protections rather seriously and have begun to
hold terms of use agreements unenforceable, especially when the
alleged harm is a privacy infringement. Part I.A will use three
cases as examples of the types of limits courts impose on terms of
use agreements—Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc.,198 Specht v.
Netscape,199 and Hines v. Overstock.com.200 Read together, these
cases demonstrate a shift by the federal judiciary towards
increasing consumer protection at the expense of web-businesses
when privacy concerns are implicated. Courts tend to be more
aggressive in interpreting terms of use agreements to the benefit of
the user when the user alleges a breach of privacy. Terms of use
agreements that precedent suggests should be binding are
scrutinized more carefully when privacy concerns are involved.
The holding of these cases suggests a shift towards a more
interventionist approach to terms of use agreements, transforming
the Internet into an area increasingly regulated by the courts.
1. Specht v. Netscape
Specht v. Netscape was the first decision by a court to
invalidate a browsewrap agreement, and it involved allegations of
privacy infringement.201 That the court chose this case to
invalidate a browsewrap agreement suggests that, as in Harris,202
the court had identified a void in privacy protection and stretched
198
199
200
201
202

622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
No. 09 CV 991(SJ), 2009 WL 2876667 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009).
Specht, 306 F.3d at 17.
Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 399.

C08_TERENZI_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FRIENDING PRIVACY

5/19/2010 12:46 PM

1085

contract principles to remedy that legislative inadequacy. Specht is
particularly noteworthy because although the controlling precedent
in the Second Circuit would have pushed the court to enforce the
terms of use agreement at issue, allegations of breach of privacy
seem to have forced the court to ignore precedent and invalidate
the agreement.203 In other words, the court attempted to afford
special protection to the privacy rights of the plaintiff, despite
precedent.
In Specht, the plaintiffs claimed that software downloaded
from the defendant’s website “invaded plaintiffs’ privacy by
clandestinely transmitting personal information to the software
provider.”204 As in both Harris and Overstock, the court limited its
holding to the enforceability of the arbitration provision, ultimately
invalidating it and establishing strong precedent for future terms of
use agreement litigation where privacy interests might be at stake.
Then-Judge Sotomayor wrote the opinion of the court, holding that
the user “did not unambiguously manifest assent to the arbitration
provision contained in the license terms.”205
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated the ECPA
by transmitting private information about their use of the
defendant’s software.206 The plaintiffs claimed that when they
installed the software, they also installed a cookie, “an
identification tag for future communications,” which allowed the
defendants to illegally eavesdrop on their Internet and computer
usage.207 Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed that by installing a
cookie on their computer, defendants profited by being able to
track a user of the defendants’ program’s page visits beyond what
could have been expected.
The court took particular issue with the lack of notice of terms
of use.208 The court noted that “no clickwrap presentation
203

See Specht, 306 F.3d at 36–37.
Id. at 17.
205
Id. at 20.
206
Id. at 21.
207
Id. (“These processes, plaintiffs claim, constituted unlawful ‘eavesdropping’ on
users of Netscape’s software products as well as on Internet websites from which users
employing SmartDownload downloaded files.”).
208
Id. at 22.
204
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accompanied” the downloading of the challenged program,
SmartDownload.209 Describing the advantages of a clickwrap
agreement, the court noted the differences between a typical
clickwrap agreement and the notice described by the plaintiffs in
SmartDownload’s terms of use agreement.210 After downloading
the program, “these plaintiffs encountered no further information
about the plug-in program or the existence of license terms
governing its use.”211 Noting that “the sole reference” to the terms
of use agreement was a text box on the following page, the court
condemned the lack of notice by concluding that the software did
not require the plaintiffs “to express unambiguous assent to that
program’s license agreement nor even to view the license terms or
become aware of their existence before proceeding with the invited
download of the free plug-in program.”212
The court proceeded with a lengthy discussion of controlling
precedent, noting that all the cases cited by the defendants “were
distinguishable on the facts” because they involved “paper
contracting.”213 The court noted that the “world of paper
contracting” was different, separate, and essentially required
different common law principles than “online transactions.”214
Indeed, the court devoted an entire section to explaining why the
cases the defendants relied on were not, in its view, applicable to
online transactions.215
Yet, the court used the term
“eavesdropping,” a word with deep colonial roots,216 to describe
the placing of a cookie on a computer, thereby cognitively linking
in-person eavesdropping and online eavesdropping. In essence, the
court allowed framing-era privacy language to have the same
meaning in both online and in-person scenarios, but required
applicable standards for contract interpretation to depend on
209

Id. at 23.
Id. at 22–24.
211
Id. at 23.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 33.
214
See id. at 31–33.
215
See id. at 33–35.
216
Id. at 21, 37, 38 (appearing four times in the court’s decision, the word
“eavesdropping” received positive recognition by the court); see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
210
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whether the contract had been agreed to online or in-person.217
The refusal of the court to allow paper contracting cases to be used
by the defense along with its willingness to allow the plaintiffs to
freely interchange concepts typically associated with corporeal
privacy infringements218 suggests that the court was making
allowances in the interest of providing enhanced protection for
online privacy. This case is important for online companies
because it shows that courts will occasionally use inconsistent
reasoning as a means of ensuring protection of a user’s privacy.
2. Harris v. Blockbuster
In Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc., the federal court for the
Northern District of Texas held that the terms of use agreement in
that case was “illusory and unenforceable” and denied
Blockbuster’s motion to compel arbitration as stipulated in the
terms of use agreement.219 The plaintiff alleged violations by
Blockbuster, Inc. of the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”)220
resulting from Blockbuster’s participation in the Facebook Beacon
Program.221 Ultimately, the court held that the terms of use
agreement written by Blockbuster and agreed to by the plaintiff
was unenforceable because of a lack of adequate consideration and
unconscionable terms.222
The Facebook Beacon program generated a lot of
controversy.223 As discussed earlier, it was a program initiated by
Facebook through which other websites could create a relationship
with Facebook; a Facebook user’s activity on another website
therefore would be broadcast as a news story on Facebook and
appear in a public feed on the site.224 Users could opt out of the
program, but essentially, the privacy concerns expressed by
Facebook users ended up scuttling the program.225 However,
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

See id. at 37–38.
See id. at 31–33.
622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 400 (2009).
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
Id. at 399.
See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
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Harris serves as an example of the concerns many social
networking websites have as a result of Facebook’s Beacon
program.
The plaintiff in Harris alleged that Blockbuster’s agreement
with Facebook, which would allow movie rental choices to be
disseminated publicly on Facebook, violated the VPPA.226 The
Harris decision did not reach the merits of the claim as it only
ruled on the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.227 The
plaintiff, a woman named Cathryn Elaine Harris, brought suit
against Blockbuster initially as a class action suit, seeking the
maximum allowed $2,500 per infringement as stipulated in the
VPPA.228 Blockbuster sought to compel arbitration and thereby
avoid a messy public battle over its role in the privacy debacle
created, in part, by the Beacon program.229
Blockbuster argued that its terms of use agreement, a clickwrap
agreement that Harris had clicked through, specifically authorized
the company to use the information in the ways the plaintiff
challenged.230 Blockbuster’s terms of use agreement included the
following language:
Blockbuster may at any time, and at its sole
discretion, modify these Terms and Conditions of
Use, including without limitation the Privacy
Policy, with or without notice. Such modifications
will be effective immediately upon posting. You
agree to review these Terms and Conditions of Use
periodically and your continued use of this Site
following such modifications will indicate your
226

Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
Id.
228
See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(A) (2006); Caroline McCarthy, Blockbuster Sued over
Role in Facebook’s Beacon Ad Program, CNET NEWS, Apr. 17, 2008,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-9921496-36.html.
229
Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
230
Id. at 397 (“As a precondition to joining Blockbuster Online, customers were
required to click on a box certifying that they had read and agreed to the Terms and
Conditions.”); see also Posting of Thomas O’Toole to E-Commerce and Tech Law Blog,
‘Illusory’ Contract Looks Awfully Familiar, http://pblog.bna.com/techlaw/2009/04/
illusory-contract-looks-awfully-familiar-.html (Apr. 20, 2009) (describing Blockbuster’s
terms of agreement as “terms that were assented to via a mouse-click”).
227
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acceptance of these modified Terms and Conditions
of Use. If you do not agree to any modification of
these Terms and Conditions of Use, you must
immediately stop using this Site.231
The court relied on precedent to rule that the language in the
above clause was too broad, one-sided, and unfair to be
enforceable.232 Specifically, the court highlighted the terms “at its
sole discretion” and “at any time” to hold that Blockbuster had
gone both too far in its reservations of rights to unilaterally amend
the contract and not far enough in granting the plaintiff notice of
the changes.233
The court relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit case Morrison v.
Amway Corporation234 to reach its decision in Harris. In
Morrison, the Fifth Circuit invalidated an arbitration provision
similar to the one at issue in Harris.235 Morrison involved a
defendant company, a seller of home goods, that was sued by
several plaintiffs for various torts, and sought to enforce an
arbitration clause against the plaintiffs.236 The plaintiffs agreed to
the arbitration clause in their contracts with the defendant.237 The
agreement, similar to Blockbuster’s, included a clause allowing the
defendant to unilaterally alter the contract; “the only express
limitation on that unilateral right [was] published notice.”238 This
led the court to suggest that the amendments made by the
defendant could be applicable to events occurring before the
amendments were even published.239
The Morrison court
distinguished the amendment clause from a similar one in In re
Halliburton Co.,240 which “specifically limited the defendant’s
ability to apply changes to the agreement.”241
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 398–99.
517 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 257; Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98.
Morrison, 517 F.3d at 252–53.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
Id.
80 S.W.3d 566, 569–70 (Tex. 2002).
Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (citing In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 569–70).
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Indeed, the lack of limitations on Blockbuster’s terms of
agreement was determinative in the Harris case.242 The fact that
Blockbuster could change the contract at any time and apply those
changes to events that occurred before the changes were made
created an illusory contract, according to the court.243 The court
then extended the Morrison rule by saying that the contract is
illusory “even when no retroactive modification has been
attempted.”244 In denying the defendant’s motion to compel
individual arbitration based on the terms of use agreement that the
plaintiff had accepted,245 the court broadened the scope of the
Morrison ruling and left the enforceability of similar agreements in
jeopardy.
The Harris decision reverberated throughout the Internet and
legal community. It is far too early to tell if Harris will have any
long-term effect on terms of use agreement drafting or on privacy
litigation, but it seems like it may have such an impact, based on
the court’s reasoning that the real concern here was privacy. The
court used an attack on the terms of agreement contract to address
an underlying concern with privacy. Harris is a warning sign for
social networking websites to draft their terms of agreement
carefully and attempt to tailor them narrowly to avoid the kinds of
problems faced by Blockbuster.

242

See id. at 399 (“The Court concludes that the Blockbuster arbitration provision is
illusory for the same reasons as that in Morrison. Here, as in Morrison, there is nothing
in the Terms and Conditions that prevents Blockbuster from unilaterally changing any
part of the contract other than providing that such changes will not take effect until
posted on the website. There are likewise no ‘Halliburton type savings clauses,’ as there
is ‘nothing to suggest that once published the amendment would be inapplicable to
disputes arising, or arising out of events occurring, before such publication.’ The Fifth
Circuit in Morrison noted the lack of an ‘express exemption’ of the ability to unilaterally
modify all rules, which the Blockbuster agreement also does not contain. The
Blockbuster contract only states that modifications ‘will be effective immediately upon
posting,’ and the natural reading of that clause does not limit application of the
modifications to earlier disputes.”).
243
Id.
244
Id. at 400.
245
Id.
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3. Hines v. Overstock.com
In Hines v. Overstock.com, the federal court for the Eastern
District for New York denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss
Cynthia Hines’s claims for breach of contract against
Overstock.com because it found the terms of use agreement invalid
and unenforceable.246 As in Harris, the arbitration clause of
Overstock.com’s terms of use agreement was the focal point of the
court’s analysis.247 However, the case differs from Harris because
rather than holding that the contract was illusory, the court held
that the plaintiff did not receive notice of the terms within the
contract sufficient to create a meeting of the minds or actual
assent.248
Ms. Hines commenced a class action suit against
Overstock.com for breach of contract, fraud, and violations of New
York General Business Law sections 349 and 350.249 The claims
originated from a thirty dollar “restocking fee” the defendant
charged Ms. Hines when she tried to return a vacuum she
purchased from Overstock.com.250 She claimed that she had never
been notified or warned of the potential charge.251 Overstock.com,
Inc. responded with a motion to dismiss or stay for arbitration or
transfer to the venue stipulated in the terms of use agreement.252
The relevant portion of the terms of use agreement is as follows:
“All retail purchases from Overstock are conducted through
Overstock’s Internet website. When an individual accesses the
website, he or she accepts Overstock’s terms, conditions and
policies, which govern all of Overstock’s customer purchases.”253
Plaintiff alleged that the placement of the terms of use agreement,

246

No. 09 CV 991(SJ), 2009 WL 2876667, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009).
Id. at *1–2.
248
Id. at *3 (“In the instant case, it is clear that Plaintiff had no actual notice of the
Terms and Conditions of Use.”).
249
Id. at *1.
250
Id. (“After receiving the vacuum, Plaintiff returned it to Defendant and was
reimbursed the full amount she had paid for it, minus a $30.00 restocking fee.”).
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
247
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on the bottom of the webpage, did not constitute actual notice of
the terms she agreed to by entering the website.254
The court essentially agreed, taking particular issue with the
way in which Overstock.com presented its terms of use agreement
to customers.255 Referring to decades of case law, the court
maintained that a contract required “a ‘meeting of the minds’ and
‘a manifestation of mutual assent.’”256 The court distinguished
clickwrap agreements from browsewrap agreements,257 providing
that “courts consider primarily ‘whether a website user has actual
or constructive knowledge of a site’s terms and conditions prior to
using the site.’”258 The court then cited several other Second
Circuit decisions finding browsewrap agreements non-binding
when the user “respond[ed] to an offer that did not carry an
immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or
required unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms.”259

254
Id. (“Plaintiff affirms, however, that she ‘never had any notice that disputes with
Overstock.com require mandatory arbitration in Salt Lake City, Utah.’ Plaintiff affirms
that when she accessed Overstock’s website to purchase the vacuum, she was never made
aware of the Terms and Conditions; specifically, Plaintiff avers that: ‘Because of this
lawsuit, I later learned that if you scroll down to the end of the website page or pages,
there is in smaller print placed between ‘privacy policy’ and Overstock.com’s registered
trademark, the words ‘site user terms and conditions.’ I did not scroll down to the end of
the page(s) because it was not necessary to do so, as I was directed each step of the way
to click on to a bar to take me to the next step to complete the purchase.’”).
255
See id. at *3 (“Hines therefore lacked notice of the Terms and Conditions because
the website did not prompt her to review the Terms and Conditions and because the link
to the Terms and Conditions was not prominently displayed so as to provide reasonable
notice of the Terms and Conditions.”).
256
Id. at *2 (citing Express Indus. & Terminal Corp. v. N.Y. Dep’t Transp., 715 N.E.2d
1050, 1050 (N.Y. 1999); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weigner, 127 P.3d 1241, 1242–43 (Utah
Ct. App. 2005); R.J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819–20 (Utah 1952)).
257
Id. (“Unlike a clickwrap agreement, a browsewrap agreement ‘does not require the
user to manifest assent to the terms and conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead gives
his assent simply by using the website.’” (quoting Sw. Airlines Co. v. Boardfirst, L.L.C.,
No. 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 483761, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007))).
258
Id. (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002)).
259
Id. at *3 (quoting Specht, 306 F.3d at 23); see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
356 F.3d 393, 402–03 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding browsewrap agreement enforceable
because the user conceded actual notice of the terms of use agreement); Motise v. Am.
Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563, 564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (refusing to find notice where
the terms of service were not presented to the plaintiff as an ISP user).
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Perhaps most interestingly, the court recognized that “very
little is required to form a contract nowadays—but this alone does
not suffice,” referring to the statement within the terms of use
agreement that users would be bound by the terms and conditions
of use via their use of the website alone.260 First, the court
distinguished this case from other browsewrap agreements in
which the notice that users would be bound by the terms of use
agreement merely by using the site was more prominently
displayed.261 The fact that the court admitted that very little was
required to form a contract, however, was a backdoor victory for
website owners and terms of use agreements.
Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that courts
will look at terms of use agreements across a spectrum of
accessibility and look at them potentially more restrictively when
privacy concerns are implicated by the plaintiff’s claims. On the
least-likely-to-be-upheld end of the spectrum are terms of use
agreements that are not prominently displayed on the website and
which bind users of the website without notice.262 On the other
end of the spectrum are prominently displayed clickwrap
agreements that require the user to scroll through the agreement
and do not reserve the right to unilaterally alter the agreement.263
Harris is the first decision to declare that an online terms of use
clickwrap agreement is unenforceable, and in fact, several
decisions from other circuits seem inconsistent with the court’s
analysis in Harris.264 The court allowed the plaintiff to pursue a
claim that required an expansion of its contract doctrine because
the injury alleged was an infringement of the plaintiff’s privacy
rights.265 Accordingly, the Harris decision could breathe life into
the widely backed argument in academia for courts and legislatures
to expand privacy protection with a modified common law
approach.
260

Hines, 2009 WL 2876667, at *3.
Id. (citing Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 121–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(finding sufficient notice where three pages completed by the plaintiff had statements
advising users that they would be bound by the use of the site)).
262
See id.
263
See, e.g., Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
264
Id.; see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
265
Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397, 399.
261
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B. Increase Privacy Online by Amending the ECPA
Advocates of increasing Internet privacy protections
legislatively argue that the federal government should amend the
ECPA or otherwise expand legislation to protect a user’s basic
expectation of privacy.266 Pressure on Congress to codify and
protect a user’s rights to privacy on social networking websites has
found widespread support from academic circles and Canada and
the European Union,267 both of which have stronger codified
protections for Internet users. Proponents of a legislative overhaul
of privacy law in the United States argue that existing legal
loopholes and immunities provide protection to only a very select
subset of Internet users, which often does not include those who
are most vulnerable to infringements of their privacy rights.268
Ultimately, those on this side of the debate claim that the free
market is not an effective safeguard of people’s privacy and that it
is the government’s responsibility to provide a uniform and
effective legal framework to both protect the consumer and restrain
the company from exploiting outdated assumptions of privacy in
the United States.269
Recently, there has been an increasing amount of attention paid
to the ECPA as a growing number of academics suggest that
Congress should use this law as a baseline from which to update
privacy protection online.270 Professor Joel R. Reidenberg has
written about the lack of a coherent privacy framework in the
United States, calling privacy rights “a fractured and incomplete
right in American law”271 and calling out the “sophistry of U.S.

266

See, e.g., Oyama, supra note 92; Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy
in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771 (1999) [hereinafter Reidenberg,
Restoring Americans’ Privacy].
267
See, e.g., Carly Brandenburg, The Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A Social
Networker’s Nightmare, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 597, 614 (2008) (“The solution to this
privacy threat can best be resolved by the courts and the legislature.”). For a discussion
on Canada and European Union Initiatives on Privacy, see infra notes 279–92.
268
See Oyama, supra note 92, at 523.
269
Id.
270
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 108, at 1208; Oyama, supra note 92, at 501; Joel R.
Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 879 (2003)
[hereinafter Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs].
271
Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 879.
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privacy policy.”272 Reidenberg argues that the current patchwork
American legislative scheme to protect privacy is insufficient.273
At issue is the fact that expectations of privacy and privacy rights
take various forms and require various degrees of protection
against infringement, a point the current legislative framework
completely ignores.274
For the purposes of this Note, Professor Reidenberg’s
discussion of “personal or private” wrongs is particularly
relevant.275 Reidenberg argues that there are at least three personal
privacy wrongs requiring legislative attention: (1) “intrusive
information practices,” (2) “misuse of personal information,” and
(3) “outrageous and noxious data disclosures.”276 Relying on
“shifting expectations” and increased public concern for privacy,
Reidenberg argues that the time is ripe for the U.S. federal
government to address privacy expectations on the Internet and
provide legislative avenues for redress of privacy right
infringements.277
Central to the argument for government intervention on
Internet privacy is a lack of faith in the free market’s ability to
account for the void in formal privacy protections. Despite a
tradition of Internet company self-regulation, advocates of
increased government in the social networking space argue that
without full disclosure of the use, acquisition, and transmission of
personal information, the Internet is in the midst of “a classic case
of market failure.”278
Echoes of this argument resonate
internationally. In the past several years, the European Union and

272

Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 773.
Id. at 772 (“For years, the United States has relied on narrow, ad hoc legal rights
enacted in response to particular scandals involving abusive information practices. The
approach has led to incoherence and significant gaps in the protection of citizens’
privacy.”).
274
Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 878.
275
Id. at 881.
276
Id. at 881–82.
277
Id. at 879; see Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 771–
72 (“During the last few years, an overwhelming majority of Americans report that they
have lost control of their personal information and that current laws are not strong enough
to protect their privacy.”).
278
Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 775.
273
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Canada have tightened privacy laws and are pressuring the United
States to do the same.279
Notably, in August of 2009, the Canadian government
effectively forced Facebook to rewrite its privacy policy to bring it
in line with Canadian privacy laws.280 Following a complaint from
the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, the Privacy
Commissioner’s Office investigated Facebook’s privacy policies
and found them lacking in conformity with Canada’s primary
privacy laws, the Privacy Act and the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”).281 The
PIPEDA governs how private sector organizations collect,282 use,
and disclose personal information while the Privacy Act focuses on
government-user data collection on the Internet.283
Four issues were of particular concern to the Privacy
Commissioner. First, as discussed earlier,284 control over third
party application developers and their access to personal
information was severely lacking on Facebook, according to the
Privacy Commissioner.285 Secondly, Facebook was unclear about
the difference between deactivating an account, whereupon
Facebook continues to hold the user’s information in its servers,
and deleting an account, where the user effectively erases his or
her data from Facebook’s servers.286
Third, the Privacy
Commissioner claimed that Facebook did not sufficiently
guarantee the privacy of non-users’ information, which is posted as
279

See, e.g., Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Announces Privacy Improvements in
Response to Recommendations by Canadian Privacy Commissioner (Aug. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=118816 [hereinafter
Facebook, Privacy Improvements].
280
Id.
281
Facebook Agrees to Address Canadian Privacy Commissioner’s Concerns, NET
NEWS PUBLISHER, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.netnewspublisher.com/facebook-agrees-toaddress-canadian-privacy-commissioners-concerns/ [hereinafter Facebook Agrees].
282
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA),
2000 S.C., ch. 5 (Can.).
283
Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P-21 (1985); Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, Mandate and Mission, http://www.priv.gc.ca/aboutUs/mm_e.cfm#contenttop
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
284
See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
285
See Facebook Agrees, supra note 281.
286
Id.
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a result of an associate’s use of the site.287 Finally, Facebook was
unclear in its privacy policy as to how it would handle the death of
a user and how friends could continue to use the user’s profile as a
memorial.288 In reaction to the Privacy Commissioner’s report,
Facebook agreed to rewrite its privacy policy and “retrofit” its site
to conform to the Privacy Commissioner’s suggestions.289
Importantly, Facebook’s changes affected its site no matter where
the user was located.290 Therefore, Facebook’s improvements to
its privacy policy, enacted at the behest of the Canadian
government, improved the privacy policy for users throughout the
world.291
The establishment of Canada’s Privacy Commissioner Office is
part of an international movement intended to strengthen privacy
rights for Internet users via government legislation and
intervention.292 In Europe, privacy is a fundamental human right,
based on a concept of dignity, beginning with the European
Union’s Directive on Data Protection of 1995, which required that
each country that was part of the European Union pass a national
privacy law and create a Data Protection Authority to protect its
citizens’ privacy.293 Indeed, as some have suggested, compared to
the United States privacy law regime, the European Union’s efforts
and legislative scheme is an aggressive, comprehensive attempt to
both reign in social networking sites’ use of their users’ personal
information and protect the European citizenry.294
Comparing the amalgam of federal and state laws that
represent the body of United States privacy law with other
287

Id.
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
See, e.g., Wayne Madsen, David L. Sobel, Marc Rotenberg & David Banisar,
Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 475 (1998).
293
Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 35 (EC);
Sullivan, supra note 23.
294
See Sullivan, supra note 23 (titling one section of the article “piecemeal approach
vs. comprehensive law” and expounding upon the differences between U.S. and E.U.
privacy law).
288
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international systems does indeed make both European and
Canadian efforts appear more substantial and more cohesive.295
Nonetheless, even advocates of an internationalist approach to
United States privacy law admit that assessing the impact of
Europe’s increased privacy protections is hard to measure.296
However, that limitation does not tend to deter proponents, such as
Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, who
call for a similarly encompassing United States privacy regime.297
The European Union looks at privacy as a “fundamental human
right,” and has a strict enforcement procedure whereby each
country is required to maintain a federal office called the Data
Protection Authority to enforce the 1995 directive.298 Further, the
European Union goes to great pains to ensure that all databases are
registered and that consumers have the right to periodically review
the information collected about them by private actors.299 Notably,
however, the European Union does not have a system set up to
ensure citizens equal protection from government infringements,
making private data collection and use of that data the European
Union’s primary focus of concern.300
Pointing to divergent court decisions, the promulgation of
conflicting state laws dealing with privacy, and pressure from
international sources, advocates of a legislative fix to privacy
concerns argue for a wholesale accounting and top-down approach
to privacy protection law.301 As social networking sites mine
terabytes of personal information concerning their users, advocates

295

See id.
Id. (“‘How do you assess whether there is a greater privacy protection or not (in
Europe) . . . . To what extent do people have rights? It’s hard to measure.’” (quoting
Daniel J. Solove)).
297
See, e.g., Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Rotenberg,
What Larry Doesn’t Get]; Marc Rotenberg, Privacy vs. Security? Privacy, HUFFINGTON
POST,
Nov.
9,
2007,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-rotenberg/privacy
-vs-security-priva_b_71806.html [hereinafter Rotenberg, Privacy vs. Security].
298
Sullivan, supra note 23 (comparing, in a chart, how E.U. and U.S. laws differ on
privacy protection).
299
Id.
300
See id.
301
See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text; see also Reidenberg, Restoring
Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 788.
296
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of a strong federal approach to regulating these entities declare that
the current immunities provided to Internet companies are too
great to make any of the existing laws effective.302 The primary
source of immunity for Internet hosts is § 230 immunity, which
provides operators of an interactive website immunity from
liability for content published on their site.303 Codified at 47
U.S.C. § 230, the immunity provision essentially jettisons all
potential claims a user of a social network might have against an
operator of the site.304 Advocates of this approach argue that as
social networking websites become more international in nature,
the United States should be the guardian of its citizens’ data and
privacy rights.305 By lacking a strong infrastructure, the United
States is forcing its citizens to seek protection abroad and
essentially feeding them to the interests that dominate the
legislative process, computer companies with strong lobbies in
Washington, D.C.306
III. URGING SOCIAL NETWORKS TO REGULATE THEMSELVES
The Internet has a strong tradition of self-regulation and letting
consumer preferences correct perceived deficiencies in security.307
As second generation social networks grow, the extent to which
302

See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(immunizing The Drudge Report for comments made by a gossip columnist); Zeran v.
Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (immunizing America Online for a
defamatory post by a customer); Paul Festa, Decision Bolsters Online-Publisher
Immunity, CNET NEWS, June 23, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/Decision-bolsters-onlinepublisher-immunity/2100-1024_3-5245395.html.
303
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006).
304
See id. But see Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165
(9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to immunize Roommates.com from an online posting that
violated Federal Housing Authority and state laws).
305
See Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 898; Reidenberg, Restoring
Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 771–72; see also Madsen et al., supra note 292;
Rotenberg, Privacy v. Security, supra note 297; Rotenberg, What Larry Doesn’t Get,
supra note 297.
306
See Facebook Agrees, supra note 281; Facebook, Privacy Improvements, supra note
279.
307
Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 877 (“The American legal system
has generally rejected legal rights for data privacy and relies instead on market selfregulation and the litigation process to establish norms of appropriate behavior in
society.”).
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companies control and use information should be determined by
what their users require and demand. Terms of use agreements
require the notice and assent of their users in order to be effective
and enforceable. Courts should apply strict notice requirements for
terms of use agreements but they should not innovate beyond
traditional applications of privacy and contract law. Privacy law
has been devised and applied in a somewhat patchwork manner.308
Rather than a comprehensive legislative approach to remedying
consumer privacy concerns, the best course of action to prevent
future breaches of privacy would be to foster a flexible marketdriven approach, based on the industry’s capacity to self-regulate.
Social networking applications that abuse personal information
for their own benefit (i.e., Facebook’s Beacon Program and
RockYou’s password security) will fail while those that have a
strong reputation for protecting privacy will attract customers and
thrive. Social networks that cooperate with each other and
encourage self-regulation will benefit by earning a reputation for
respecting user privacy. Industry self-regulation does not mean
that companies should simply protect the privacy of their own
users. Industry self-regulation requires second generation social
networking sites (such as YingYang and Blippy), Facebook, and
Google, among others, to take steps that actively foster an online
environment where users can feel safe and secure by clearly
defining their privacy policies, publicizing privacy breaches that
occur on other sites, and banning information-sharing with sites
that violate generally accepted privacy standards.
Social networks need to take several actions to sufficiently
safeguard their users’ information. First, privacy policies need to
be explicit and understandable to the layperson in order to create a
clear and definable legal relationship between the user and the site.
There have been sufficient changes within the last several years to
standard privacy policies and terms of use agreements to anticipate
that second generation social networks will protect PII according
to users’ expectations.309 Start-up companies, such as YingYang
308

Id. (“Information privacy is protected through an amalgam of narrowly targeted
rules.”).
309
Compare YingYang’s Privacy Policy, http://www.yingyang.com/privacy/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2010) (easily accessible and clearly articulated), with Facebook’s Privacy

C08_TERENZI_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FRIENDING PRIVACY

5/19/2010 12:46 PM

1101

and Friend Feed, have made their privacy policies easy to read and
understand. Bullet points highlighting the most important privacy
provisions ensure informed consent by the user.
Further,
limitations on what the company anticipates doing and is legally
allowed to do with the user-supplied PII avoid the overly broad
wording previously ruled invalid in Overstock.310
Second, terms of use agreements need to be not only clearly
written, but also need to specify how the social network interacts
with APIs. Terms of use agreements defining API use will be
increasingly important as social networks begin to distribute and
share information as sensitive as real-time locations and credit card
purchases. API’s, in particular, represent a fundamental challenge
to traditional contract models, such as privity of contract and
informed consent. APIs, which distribute information across
platforms and enable third party application developers to access
information on a social network, have their own terms of use
agreements, which are most often agreed to as an addendum to the
primary network’s terms of use agreement. Although complicated,
the user should be presented with this terms of use agreement, and
agreeing to the API’s terms of use should require more notice than
is customarily presently.
Third, in the wake of privacy violations, such as RockYou’s
password debacle,311 the industry as a whole should respond by
isolating the guilty site and ending cooperation with the site until
the privacy breach has been remedied. This should be standard
industry practice.312 If a third-party developer is caught spamming
or irresponsibly distributing information, all social networks
should immediately cut them off, alert their users, and suspend
communication with the site until the privacy problem not only has
been addressed, but remedied.
One example of a company that has embraced self-regulation
successfully is Google. Google has an understanding of its users’

Policy, supra note 20 (confusing to a layperson because it is littered with legalese and
industry jargon).
310
See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
311
See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
312
See Khare, supra note 18.
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hopes and needs for transparency of use of their information.313
First of all, Google anonymizes all of the information it collects
about its users, so that in sharing the information across APIs, the
information is not traceable to any specific or individual user.314
Further, in November of 2009, Google launched a “Privacy
Dashboard,” which contains a list of all of a user’s applications and
allows the user to set his or her privacy preferences accordingly for
each application.315 By allowing the user to control the flow of
information, Google is attempting to assuage the fears of its users
and earn the trust of the Internet community.316 By encrypting and
anonymizing the information of its users, Google shields its users
from intrusive and invasive use of their PII.
Industry self-regulation has proven remarkably effective in
remedying, clarifying and preventing privacy breaches.
In
February 2010, Google launched Google Buzz, a new social
networking tool integrated into its users’ email interface.317 Within
one day of the launch, technology-focused blogs identified several
features that jeopardized user privacy.318 Specifically, Google
Buzz automatically found followers for users based on their
contact lists. These lists were, by default, made public, so other
users could find out who their friends were emailing.319
Theoretically, this feature endangered journalists with confidential
sources and businesses with customer lists, as well as any other
relationships that were intended to be private.320 Within four days,
313

See generally Google Privacy Center, http://www.google.com/privacy.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2010).
314
Id.
315
Erick Schonfeld, Google Gives You a Privacy Dashboard to Show Just How Much It
Knows About You, TECHCRUNCH, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/11/05/
google-gives-you-a-privacy-dashboard-to-show-just-how-much-it-knows-about-you.
316
See id.
317
Matt McGee, Liveblogging the Google Buzz Launch, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, Feb. 9,
2010, http://searchengineland.com/liveblogging-the-google-social-event-35702.
318
See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, WARNING: Google Buzz Has a Huge Privacy Flaw,
BUS. INSIDER, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/warning-google-buzz-hasa-huge-privacy-flaw-2010-2; Kashmir Hill, The Huge Privacy Flaw in Google Buzz (and
How to Fix It), TRUESLANT, Feb. 10, 2010, http://trueslant.com/KashmirHill/2010/
02/10/the-huge-privacy-flaw-in-google-buzz-and-how-to-fix-it.
319
See Carlson, supra note 318.
320
See, e.g., Robin Wauters, Google Buzz Privacy Issues Have Real Life Implications,
TECHCRUNCH, Feb. 12, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/12/google-buzz-privacy/
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Google responded to the online furor by issuing an apology321 and
modifying the problematic features.322 While critics will point to
this situation as a failure of privacy law in America, it would have
been nearly impossible to conceptualize and design anticipatory
legislation for the innovation behind Google Buzz.
The benefits of relying on self-regulation are consistent with
both the Internet’s tradition and its future. Second generation
social networking start-ups, such as YingYang, Blippy, and
Foursquare, grow, benefit, and thrive from the free exchange of
information. Collectors and traders of rare sneakers achieve a
higher level of satisfaction when they can freely exchange price
and availability information via a social network platform.
Transparency is perhaps the key benefit of the Internet, and social
networking sites enable and achieve a maximum flow of
knowledge. People benefit by giving YingYang their information,
and YingYang benefits too by increasing advertising revenue.
However, the amount and type of information the networks collect
and their users divulge is becoming increasingly specialized,
requiring a more clear and complete understanding of the extent of
control the social network exercises over the information.
As discussed above, in cases such as Harris323 and Specht,324
courts have gone out of their way to provide users who regret
giving up control of their personal information with relief. These
cases should be read as a common law approach to provide a
?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+
%28TechCrunch%29.
321
Posting of Todd Jackson to The Official Gmail Blog, A New Buzz Start-up
Experience Based on Your Feedback, http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-buzzstart-up-experience-based-on.html (Feb. 13, 2010, 15:53 PST) (“We’ve heard your
feedback loud and clear, and since we launched Google Buzz four days ago, we’ve been
working around the clock to address the concerns you’ve raised.”); see also Thomas
Claburn, Google Sorry About Buzz Privacy, INFO. WK., Feb. 16, 2010,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/windows/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=2
22900563&subSection=Securityc.
322
Jason Kincaid, Google Buzz Abandons Auto-Following Amid Privacy Concerns,
TECHCRUNCH, Feb. 13, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/13/google-buzz-privacyupdate/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcr
unch+%28TechCrunch%29 (noting that Google “isn’t wasting any time in responding to
user criticism” by modifying Google Buzz features).
323
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
324
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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remedy for violations of privacy expectations in the absence of a
legislative remedy. Advocates of supplying such a legislative
remedy ignore the rapid pace of social networking technology
development. Facebook is less than six years old and Twitter is
less than three years old. It would have been nearly impossible to
expect that within a year or two of the iPhone 3G launch,325 there
would be several hundred thousand people making use of locationbased social networking applications. It is easier to envision a
blanket prohibition on the misuse of personal information by social
networks than it would be to implement such a regime. Congress
lacks the mechanisms to keep up with the pace of innovation
online and the constantly developing methods of informationsharing available to social networks.
Rather than attempting to win an arms race against social
networks, Congress should focus on codifying current common
law regarding notice requirements of terms of use agreements.
Providing a set of uniform procedures would enable greater
predictability of the enforceability of terms of use agreements for
both users and operators of social networks. The industry should
make common sense language standard for terms of use
agreements, but this requirement should be instituted organically,
not via a law. Legal requirements for terms of use agreements
should include posting the site’s privacy policy clearly. There
should be a requirement that the user scroll through the entire set
of terms of use and affirmatively click-through the agreement or be
required to type “I understand and I agree.” By focusing on the
procedures governing the establishment of the user-site operator
relationship, Congress can ensure an informed decision-making
process, while leaving the substance of the user-operator
relationship subject to the terms of use agreement. In defining a
baseline set of procedures, Congress can effectively ensure notice
for the user of the terms of use, while allowing companies
themselves to battle for customers based upon the amount of
privacy protection they provide.

325
Brandon Griggs, iPhone 3Gs Launch Has App Developers Seeing Gold, CNN.COM,
June 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/06/19/iphone.3gs.launch/index.html.
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The social networking industry is capable of resolving privacy
concerns, but it needs to take certain steps quickly. Second
generation social networks need to act aggressively before
Congress attempts to limit the kind or amount of information that
users are allowed to share via social networks and to mitigate the
uneven administration of justice by courts providing ad hoc
remedies for vague privacy injuries. The resolution of this debate
will have dramatic consequences for the Internet, our domestic
economy, and federal courts. We are now in the infancy of social
networking, proved by the limited duration of most networks and
their accompanying sky-high valuations. The time is ripe for the
United States to determine its participation in social networking.
Neither a strictly common-law approach nor a comprehensive
legislative overhaul of privacy law sufficiently addresses the
concerns of social network users. Legislation should focus on
fine-tuning the notice requirements of terms of use agreements.
Any complete overhaul of privacy law will constantly lag behind
the Internet community, and it will force traditional concepts of
privacy rights to never completely square with the issues raised by
social networking, particularly those that utilize location-based
technology or other niche second generation social networks.
Instead, the United States should provide a set of strict notice
requirements for terms of use agreements, which will strengthen
the world of online contracting and enable, rather than hinder, its
citizenry the freedom to contract, use, and enjoy social networking.
CONCLUSION
Social networking, the ability for users to connect and share
personal information over a privately owned Internet-based
platform, raises a number of information privacy rights issues.
Terms of use agreements dictate the amount of control users of
social networks retain over the personal information they share
with a social network. Over the past several years, as social
networking has taken a more central role in people’s lives, courts
and legislatures have been attempting to regulate and remedy the
privacy concerns and issues raised by the widespread use of
networks such as Facebook and Twitter on their own, without
clearly defined limits. While privacy law has never been very
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comprehensive in the United States, especially when compared to
Europe, recent attempts to govern privacy on social networks have
been particularly patchwork and confusing. Social networks need
to proactively effectuate industry self-regulation to both avoid user
anxiety and overreaching congressional legislation. Rather than
attempt to reverse centuries of tradition in the privacy realm,
Congress should provide social networks with a set of
requirements for their terms of use agreements, including strict
notice requirements, and encourage courts to apply these notice
requirements rigorously, leaving the extent of ownership of
personal information to contractual bargaining between the
network and its users.

